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In this paper I shall attempt to show that
theorising, even of the most abstract kind, is,
where appropriately tackled, of direct rele-
vance to pressirlg practical problems in the
teaching of the arts and design. This is not to
say that every practitioner should be philo-
sophising consciously and articulately all the
time he is working - he would probably
never finish anything - but I shall suggest
that some study of aesthetics can be of great
value to all educators in the arts and that it
can help them to sort out some fashionable
educational terms which are used all too
often in a confused al'ld confusing way.
I mean by 'aesthetics' the philosophy of
art and would argue, given more time and
space, that this can include (via the concept
of 'form') the philosophy of design in a
sense which reaches far beyond what we
normally mean by the fine arts. There are
also psychological and sociological
aesthetics, but it is the philosopher's job to
include these within the range of his en,
quiry.
Theorising is regarded by some art
teachers as dangerous, since they fear that
analysis destroys creativity; but older pupils
and adults cannot be kept in a non-
differentiating, infantile state and thinking
about one's work - what one is trying to
achieve and how to achieve it - is necessary
to every practitioner, even though much of
the thinking may not be verbal. The problem
for the art educator is to find ways of
helping pupils or students regain or retain
the flexibility and fluidity of earlier stages of
thought and feeling in their development,
while also being capable of structuring them
in meaningful, purposive ways.
The important thing for imaginative or
creative thought is not to regress from the
patterns of one's socialised thought to a
chaos of 'booming, buzzing confusion' and
'undifferentiated mush', but to rise above
stereotyped forms and use them in new
ways. A painter, poet, sculptor, inventor all
solve problems by using ready-structured
thought in a more free way than the
unimaginative person. Occasionally they will
significantly break a rule - not because they
did not know about the rule, but because,
understanding the reason for its existence,
they decide it is not necessary to their
particular purposes but an inhibiting in-
fluence. Thus the creative thinker makes
some of his own rules as he goes along - not
in an anarchial way, form miraculously
arising out of chaos, but in a rule-recognising
and purposive way.
Some study of aesthetics, then, can help
teachers tease apart the confusions which
arise in this highly complex and intelligent
activity that involves feelings, emotions,
manual skills and dexterity, sometimes sheer
physical strength as well as penetrating
intellectual enquiry. To illustrate the contri-
bution that some study of aesthetics can
make I shall give examples of a few concepts
with which aestheticians have concerned
themselves, showing briefly how further
study in such areas could be invaluable to
the art and design educator who wants to
make clear to others, as well as to himself,
just what he is about and just why his
discipline cannot be treated in exactly the
same way as other disciplines like maths or
science, even though it will frequently draw
upon and use both of those disciplines.
Expressive theories of art grew as alter-
natives to classical mimetic or represen-
tational theories. As criteria of truth and the
demand that a work should be a 'good
likeness' receded, especially during the
Romantic Age, so the notion of art as
expressing and communicating feeling and
emotion came to the fore, and a similar
change of approach is evident in educational
theory. 'Self-expression' is currently re-
garded as self-evidently valuable, though
how one evaluates such 'expression', or even
decides whether it has taken place, remains
unclear. Modern aesthetics has been much
given to showing the inadequacies of a
purely emotive theory of expression and one
way in which we can approach this is to
differentiate between four very different
sensesof the word.
a) The first and most simple meaning is
that of physical expression. A sneeze, for
example, is an involuntary action to
'express' some foreign body from the nasal
passage;waste matter is 'expressed' from the
body.
b) The second is analogous to the first:
expressing (or getting rid of) emotion. A
child in a temper tantrum or an adult cursing
and swearing may thereby 'work off' feelings
of frustration: pent-up feelings have been
released in hot air, like the steam from a
pressure cooker. Some interpretations of
Aristotle's notion of catharsis suggestthat an
analogy with physical expression is in mind,
and Aristotle's use of the Greek word for
'purge' (he writes of the 'purging of
emotion' in the Poetics)" bears· this out to
some extent. Catharsis has also been linked
with Greek mythico-religious notions of
purification and this, too, suggeststhe expel-
ling and washing away of moral guilt and
pollution, that is, of something undesirable.
It is probably not possible to determine
exactly what Aristotle did mean, but seen
within the whole context of his ethical
theory and views on psychology we do know
that he saw a healthy balance of emotion as
necessary to motivate the soul and not to be
eliminated asundesirable.
Unfortunately, an over-simple notion of
'expression', where it is understood as releas-
ing emotion and nothing more, has led to a
fairly wide and largely unquestioned view
that the arts (which are certainly to some
extent concerned with the emotions) func-
tion almost entirely as a useful and thera-
peutic channel of release for emotion.
Branches of the arts may be included in the
curriculum of a school almost entirely on
therapeutic grounds, so that teaching and
learning in the arts is quite often not
regarded aseducative in itself, but asa useful
safety-valve, on a par with going out to play,
which reduces children to a fit state to get
on with the serious businessof ed4cation, or
the non-arts subjects on the curriculum.
Both senses of 'expression' so far
examined - physical expression and the
release of emotion - can be regarded as
expression which is symptomatic of a human
condition. The expressive event (sneeze or
tantrum) is a symptom by which one might
try to diagnose the person's condition. The
other two senses are not concerned with
symptomatic meanings, but with symbolic
meanings. Harold Osborne, in his book The
Art of Appreciation, quotes from Peter
Abraham's novel Wild Conquest to illustrate
a person's struggle to raise his expression
from the symptomatic expression of frus-
tration to a symbolic communication which
conveys conceptual meaning. A slave is
trying to formulate his longing for a freedom
that he has never known:
What is freedom? He hied to think about it. He
knew it was something he felt, something deep
inside him. Having it or not having it made all
the difference to the way a man felt about the
food he ate, about the words he spoke, about
the wind and the rain on his face, about the way
he looked at children in their play, about the
way he kissed his woman and the way he
walked and the look in his eyes. That he knew,
but how to tell them that, how to make them
understand that, that was the difficulty.
c) My third senseof 'expression' is expres-
sion which structures thought and feeling in
conventional ways. The slave in Abraham's
novel had no experiences and no framework
of conventional meanings with which to
formulate his intense but inarticulate feel-
ings. Had he and his fellows known freedom,
articulated it symbolically, but then lost it,
they would still have had the social know-
ledge and the self-knowledge to understand
(conceive of) their predicament and frus-
tration and, perhaps, be more able to do
something about it.
Conventional symbolic meanings are not
only carried by verbal vehicles, though word-
meanings are the most obvious. Religious
and secular social rituals carry shared mean-
ings, as do the recognised signals of a
technological society like traffic lights and
door-bells. Art. too, has a vast store-house of
recognised meanings and associations of
meanings and the more one has been ini-
tiated into the various frames of meaning the
more one can recognise, say, the Miltonic
allusions in Keats' poetry or traces of a
master's style in the innovative painter.
d) Lastly, and perhaps most rarely, we
have expression which structures thought
and feeling by using conventions in pur-
posively unconventional ways. This is the
kind of expression where an individual has a
rich stock of conventional meanings and
expertise and, far from being hide-bound by
them, has the flexibility to turn them to his
own ends. A part of such flexibility must
involve the capacity to know what these
ends are, and to ~hoose between them, so
the articula~ion (or putting into some kind
of symbolic formi of feelings, preferences,
perhaps confl icts, ~nd intentions is essential.
Abraham's slave was already groping after
such articulation when he picked up the
meanings and the images that he did know -
wind and rain on his face, children at play -
and tried to re-order them and see them
from a different and as yet unknown point of
view.
I suggest that 'expression' in senses c) and
d) are the only senses in which the educator,
as such, is primarily concerned. To the
extent that teachers are also child-m inders or
therapists, and to the extent that purely
physical or emotipnal expression may be
relevant to symblilic expression, then we
may also be concerned in schools and
colleges with senses a) and b); but to limit
one's concern to non-symbolic and sympto-
matic expression is to opt out of being an
educator at all. For, as a part of his hope to
bring about changes for the better in pupi Is
and students, the educator is concerned to
help them find and make their lives meaning-
ful.
Another reaction against the classical view
that art represents, or mirrors, 'nature' is the
idea that it provides an escape from, or
compensation for, the limitations of the
unavoidable world of 'facts'. I believe that
such a view under-rates the status of the arts
(they tend to become a mere and meaning-
less frill to the more serious business of life)
and forces a misleading distinction between
the arts and the exploratory work of science
and technology. Again, some analysis of
different meanings of 'illusion' will help to
clarify the issue.
a) Certain featu res in some art forms serve
to trick us into believing what is not the
case: trompe l'oeil effects, of which any
number can be found in psychology text-
books on perception; the way in which
perspective techniques can make us believe
that a flat plane has, in fact, depth; arrange-
ment of lines which give a still picture the
appearance of movement; 'op' art - all of
these do deceive the eye; but a complete
aesthetic theory built upon such a concept
of illusion soon fails. First, because it would
be too wide: any deception of the eye would
be a work of art; and secondly, because it
does not begin to cope with questions about
the overall structure of art forms. This
aspect of 'illusion' remains a matter of
technique which may, or may not, be used
to aesthetic purpose and good effect.
b) Some illusionists are not so much
concerned with the mere technicalities of a)
but with the weird fantasy and delusion
these techniques can conjure up. Psychedelic
and mind-blowing experiences are regarded
as desirable and valuable in their own right.
Some of the romantics, William Blake, for
example, regarded the empirical world as an
unbearable prison of observable facts and
created their own worlds of fantasy and
delight; but Blake still insisted that his
mythical world was the reality while
Newton, Boyle and Locke were deluding
themselves within the narrow rut of empiri-
cism. A person's view of 'reality' (and hence
his conception of 'illusion') depends upon
the 'language game' or meaning-framework
he habitually uses.This is probably partly a
matter of temperament and very much a
matter of upbringing and socialisation. One's
conception of the 'facts' of the world
around one are necessarily tied to the
symbolisms available with which one can
think and talk about them. Get on the inside
of a different set of cultural meanings and
the 'facts' would look very different and
ceaseto appear immutable.
c) Semblance - this term was used by
Carl Jung in his writings on dream imagery,
and he meant by it 'unreal by the measures
of public fact'. One's expectations of events
are based upon experience and the sym-
bolisms used by which one interprets that
experience, so inevitably conventional
meanings help to define what one means by
'fact', 'real' and 'unreal'. In dreaming, the
consistency of conventional language-games
collapses and we move in a world which
seems real but which, on waking and apply-
ing the consistency of criteria of conven-
tional meaning-frames, we reject as non-
sense. In some respects, meanings in art are
similar to dream meanings in that they pick
up conventions and use them in anti-
conventional ways. Yet there is, or so most
aestheticians would argue, a very significant
difference between the confused ramblings
of a dream and the significant ramblings of,
say, King Lear or his Fool. I shall not
attempt here to define that important
difference.
It will be seen that this last kind of
'illusion', or semblance, may be relevant to
the last type of 'expression', where conven-
tions are used in unconventional ways. To
think creatively may well demand the capa-
city to take conventional meanings into a
thought-world of semblance: not with the
critical mind switched off and unconscious,
as in the dream, but active even while it
holds its own tools and symbolisms under
question.
Coming, perhaps, only second to 'expres-
sion' in educational terminology in the arts,
'imagination' also needs unpacking.
a) Sometimes all that is meant by the
term is the capacity to form images in the
mind. So one person may be described as
having a 'visual imagination', that is, he
tends to think with visual images, while
another may have an aural and another a
tactile imagination. Yet another may claim
to think almost entirely in words.
b) Secondly, we may mean that an 'imagi-
native' person has a rich and varied fantasy
life. Indeed, he may be so absorbed in his
compensatory dreams that he never comes
to terms with the demands of everyday
living at all, fantasy and ineffectualness
growing together.
c) Rather differently, being 'imaginative'
may mean being an independent thinker,
and there isa toughness here lacking in (b)
The 'difficult' pupil or student is often the
one who refuses to accept stereotyped
notions of 'fact' and 'real'.
d) Finally, and all too rarely, there is the
person who is imaginative in Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's sense, when he wrote in Bio-
graphia Literaria of the 'esemplastic power'
of Imagination which is of a different order
from mere fancy. 'Fancy', said Coleridge,
'plays with mere fixities and definities'; it
takes ready-formed concepts and jumbles
them up in new ways; but Imagination
questions and breaks down the concepts
with which it builds, not just rearranging
them, but building anew, from the very
foundations, aesthetic structures that are
original, 'organic' wholes. The difference
between 'imagination c)' and 'imagination
d)' is that the latter moves on into that as
yet undefined class where confused rambl-
ings have become significant 'ramblings' and
forms are built which have an aesthetic unity
and integration which, to some extent, defy
analysis. I would prefer to keep the term
'imagination' for this last sense,which may
be described asref{Jsal to accept stereotyped
notions of 'fact' and 'real', coupled with
restructuring power. There remain enor-
mous problems about evaluation, appraisal
and the criteria for deciding whether a
structure has aesthetic unity, though I sus-
pect the problems within technological
design will not be so great, since at least the
function and purpose of such a structure will
usually be much easier to formulate.
This 'hurrah' word of our educational times
is used'in a notoriously ambiguous fashion,
and this is a pity, for a great deal of valuable
practical work is being done under the
'integration' banner even though the
rationale has not, in my opinion, been
worked out in a clear and satisfactory way.
Again, there are four very distinct sensesof
'i ntegration'.
a) The integration of knowledge, with
which modern curriculum theory is much
concerned, can be shown to have at least
three separate possibilities. It is a little out
of fashion now to talk of 'the seamlesscloak
of knowledge', as if all ways of knowing and
all symbolisms could be ultimately fitted
into one all-containing and logically consis-
tent whole (a.I). Indeed, the more diverse a
culture becomes the more it appears that
some different specialisms work in a way
that is definitely not consistent with the
assumptions of other specialisms, so that
fears about the fragmentation of knowledge
appear to have some point; but it has
certainly not been proven that the creation
of an all-embracing and consistent meaning-
framework is logically impossible.
There is a vast difference, though,
between an all-integrating system of
meanings, fully articulated and clarified, and
that kind of 'knowledge' sometimes called
'intuition', where a range of possible
meanings are felt (asthe slave felt his longing
for freedom) as an undifferentiated and
unarticulated whole (a.2). The young child's
'knowledge' is of this relatively undif-
ferentiated kind; and so are the early stages
of problem-solving and creative thought.
A third way of considering the inte-
gration of knowledge is to view all the ways
of knowing that a society or a culture has
developed as a set of distinct but relatable
disciplines which do not necessarily relate
into one consistent and coherent whole
(a.3). Educationalists like Professor Hirst
claim that an individual mind cannot
develop without initiation into a balanced
range of these logically distinct disciplines.
In this way, treating the disciplines as
autonomous, to some extent, is a necessary
pre-requisite for any meaningful integration
of the disciplines.
b) Integration of the person has a thera-
peutic ring about it, but is also linked with
what is probably one of the foremost values
of our society: that of individual autonomy.
Now this sense of 'integration' can be seen
to link closely with 'expression' in sensesc)
and d), for a person cannot formulate any
knowledge or understanding of himself and
his environment without some use of con-
ventional meanings; and he cannot see him-
self as an autonomous individual, to some
extent dependent on, yet also independent
of, the community within which his mind
develops, unless he can at the same time
question those conventional symbolisms and
attempt to build imaginatively with them.
c) Anxiety about fragmentation is not
only directed at the fragmentation of know-
ledge. Closely associated with this epis-
temological problem is the problem of social
fragmentation within a mass society, and
often 'integration' as a pro-word re·fers to
the integration of social groups. Some philo-
sophers, notably Ernst Cassirer and Susanne
Langer, have argued that the whole range of
mythical meanings within a community per-
forms a socially cohesive function. Both of
these writers feared that in a society which
favours differentiation of knowledge we are
losing the capacity to think in mythical
terms and that this is aggravating the
problems about fragmentation of knowledge
and of society. Not nearly enough of these
very suggestive ideas have yet permeated
into British educational theory, although P
H Phenix in America would appear to have
been influenced by Cassirer's thought to
some extent.
d) Lastly, we return to art and design;
and this is no accident. I believe that art and
design education has a far more significant
and fundamental part to play in education as
a whole than has yet been recognised, for
where it is done well it encourages skilled,
purposive, independent yet integrating
thought; and the final sense of 'integration'
is that of a particular design, whether art
form, building, machine, etc. Design edu-
cation can help children and adults to think
and make in experimental but purposive
ways, and education which encourages
various forms of adaptable, independent yet
skilled and rule-recognising thought and be-
haviour becomes more and more a funda-
mental necessity.
It is possible to see a gradual progression,
through an individual's development, of
'integration' in these different senses. 'Inte-
gration' in sense a) 2, which is undifferen-
tiated rather than integrated, is syncretistic
and 'whole' in a very limited sense. The
small child experiences it and, somewhat
similarly, the first relatively undifferentiated
'idea' for a design in art or technology is still
felt as a whole, though the details are not
yet worked out. The problem for creativity
is to translate 'integration' in sense a) 2 into
'integration' in sense a) 3, and finally, into
'integration' in sense d). The ways in which
various skills and disciplined modes of
thought are to be related will depend upon
the purposes of the maker, and his formu-
lation of these will depend, to some extent,
upon his 'integration' in senses b) and c). If
'expression' in sense d) is to occur, the
person must be capable of questioning the
'measures of public fact'; that is, to doubt
that reality is tied to set forms of knowledge
even while he uses the forms of knowledge
that have been developed by his culture.
Having outlined an analysis of some key
concepts in aesthetic education, I want to
suggest now that this (very relevant) the oris-
ing is only a beginning, for some questions
have _emerged which, I think, demand
further enquiry. Here are just four areas of
enquiry which seem to me to demand
investigation:
1. What techniques can teachers use to
encourage skilled use of cultural
frames of meaning even while they
also encourage the limitations of these
forms to be questioned?
2. What are the specific skills of working
together in a team; whether as a group
of teachers integrating their various
special isms, or as a group of pupils/
stu de n ts/ a rti sts/designers working
together on a project?
3. To what extent are cultural forms of
knowledge, techniques and tech-
nologies discrete and what are the
logical links between special isms which
make for meaningful and relevant
integration?
4. Contrast the kinds of purposes, or
intentions, that are relevant to expres-
sion in the fine arts with the kind of
purposes that are relevant in tech-
nological problem-solving. At what
points do the two inter-relate?
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